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MARYLAND COUNTERS APARTHEID: BOARD OF TRUSTEES
v. CITY OF BALTIMORE 1
Board of Trustees v. Baltimore is the first opinion in the nation2
where a state's highest appellate court has upheld the constitutionality
of a municipal ordinance requiring the divestment from city workers'
pension fund of investments in companies doing business in South Af-
rica. The local law at issue in this case expressed the moral outrage of
the citizens of Baltimore against the system of apartheid and translated
this outrage into concrete action to direct the City's investments away
from enterprises connected with South Africa.
Other jurisdictions have passed statutes to express anti-apartheid
sentiments, but not all have survived intensive judicial scrutiny. The
Baltimore Ordinance may serve as a blueprint for citizens in other state
or local jurisdictions to articulate similar attitudes and effect positive
results. In fact, one commentator estimates that if all the state and
local legislation relating to divestment of United States funds in South
Africa were enacted, a cumulative liquidation of more than $17.8 bil-
lion worth of investments in banks and companies with business in
South Africa would result.'
The purpose of this note is to synthesize the complex array of fac-
tual and legal issues facing the Maryland Court of Appeals, to place
this decision within the context of other state and local divestment leg-
islation, and to offer some insight on how this particular decision may
affect the trend of the law. Part I sets out the facts of the case. Part II
analyzes the treatment of the issues by the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Part III briefly compares the Baltimore Ordinance to legislation in
other state jurisdictions. Part IV discusses the impact of this case on
United States foreign policy.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. The Divestiture Ordinance
On July 3, 1986, the Mayor of Baltimore signed Ordinance Num-
1. 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720 (1989).
2. Feeley, CA Rules Baltimore City Divestment Law is Legal, Daily Record,
Sept. 5, 1989 at 1, col. 3
3. Lewis, Kevin P. Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and
Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 473-475 (1989). This section of
the article describes the various statutes that have been enacted and their total esti-
mated impact on investments in South Africa.
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ber 765 as an amendment to the City Code.4 It provides that no funds
of the Employees Retirement System (ERS) and the Fire and Police
Retirement System (F&P) "shall remain invested in, or in the future
shall be invested in banks or financial institutions that make loans to
South Africa or Namibia 5 or companies 'doing business' with those
countries." 6 Later, to avoid a possible oversight, the City Council
passed, and the Mayor signed, Ordinance Number 792 which applied
the City's divestiture program to the Elected Officials Retirement Sys-
tem (EOS).7
The Ordinance requires that organizations doing business with or
in South Africa "shall be identified by reference to the most recent
annual report of the Africa Fund entitled 'Unified List of United States
companies with Investments or Loans in South Africa and Namibia.' "8
The Ordinance further stipulates that the divestiture program shall oc-
cur within a two-year period, beginning January 1, 1987. The Board of
Trustees for each of the systems would be empowered to suspend the
program during this two-year transition period for a maximum of
ninety days if the following specific findings are made: (1) the rate of
return on the funds is substantially lower than the average annual earn-
4. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE, art. 22, § 7 (a)(13) (1987) (1983 & Supp.
1987).
5. Since 1921 until March 21, 1990, Namibia or "South West Africa" was a
territory administered by South Africa. In November'1989, Namibia held free, demo-
cratic elections and is currently in the process of adopting a new constitution. In Board
of Trustees v. Baltimore, the Court included Namibia in its reference to South Africa.
It is unclear whether the Trustee will be required to divest funds from companies
doing business exclusively in or with Namibia after Namibia's independence. Presently,
companies doing business in or with Namibia are identified through correspondence
with the United Nations Office of the Commisssion for Namibia and the United Na-
tions Center for Transnational Corporations. See, Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317
Md. at 80-81, n. 4, 562 A.2d at 724.
6. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE, art. 22, § 23(b) (1987) (1983 & Supp. 1987).
7. The total value of the three pension systems is approximately $1.2 billion. Of
the total, 40-50% of the funds are invested in either equity or common stock, and 40-
50% are invested in fixed income instruments or cash and short-term equivalents.
Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. 79-80. 562 A.2d at 723.
Each of the City's three pension funds is administered by a separate Board of
Trustees which is reponsible for ensuring that members and beneficiaries ultimately
receive the benefits to which they are entitled, including specific benefits and "variable"
benefits which depend on the rate of return of the funds. Under the variable benefits
program, if the rate of return exceeds-7.5%, then the amount greater than 7.5% and
less than 10% goes to the payment of additional benefits. If the rate of return exceeds
10%, then one-half of the amount over 10% goes toward the payment of additional
benefits, and the remaining half goes to Baltimore City. Id. at 80, 562 A.2d at 723.
8. Id. at 80-81, 562 A.2d at 724.
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ings on the funds over the past five years; (2) continued divestiture
under the Ordinance will be inconsistent with generally accepted in-
vestment standards for conservators of pension funds, notwithstanding
the Ordinance; and (3) divestiture under the program will cause finan-
cial losses to the funds. 9
B. The Challenge to the Ordinance
On December 31, 1986, Trustees for each of the three pension sys-
tems and two employee beneficiaries filed an action against the Mayor
and City Council in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. They asked
that the Court declare the Ordinance invalid for the following reasons:
(1) The Ordinance impermissibly delegated legislative power to a pri-
vate entity, the Africa Fund; (2) the Ordinance unconstitutionally im-
paired the obligation of the City's pension contracts with the benefi-
ciaries under the systems; (3) the Ordinance was preempted by the
federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986; (4) the Ordinance
intruded on the federal government's exclusive power to conduct for-
eign policy; and (5) the Ordinance violated the Commerce Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.
On January 9, 1987, four pension beneficiaries moved to intervene
on the side of the Trustees. They raised similar arguments and, in a
three-count complaint, asserted that the Ordinance intrudes on the fed-
eral government's exclusive foreign policy power, violates the Com-
merce Clause, and violates the property rights of the beneficiaries
under the "takings" clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.1"
C. Crucial Findings of Fact by the Trial Court
The Trustees and applicants for intervention filed motions for sum-
mary judgment, both of which were denied because the Circuit Court
found it necessary to determine the facts related to the financial impact
of the Ordinance on the pension systems. During a lengthy trial, both
parties presented massive amounts of technical information through a
variety of expert witnesses in the field of financial management."
At the outset of the trial, both parties agreed that the Ordinance
would not affect the funds' fixed income investments.12 Later, the trial
judge held that the Ordinance would not impair the performance of the
9. Id. at 81, 562 A.2d at 724.
10. Id. at 83 n. 7, 562 A.2d at 725.
11. See Brief for Appellants, Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, Md. Court of Ap-
peals, Nos. 95 and 104, September Term, 1987
12. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 84 n.10, 562 A.2d at 725.
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pensions' equity funds."3 However, the trial judge did find that the Or-
dinance would affect the pensions' Short Term Investment Fund
(STIF) because the STIF included investments in companies doing
business in South Africa. Since comparable substitutes for the STIF
investments may not be immediately available, the pension systems
may be forced to increase their investments in lower-yielding obliga-
tions.14 The trial judge also found that the divestiture re4uired by the
Ordinance would entail both initial one-time costs and on-going costs. 15
Ultimately, the trial judge calculated that the initial cost of divestiture
to the beneficiaries would amount to only 1/32 of 1 % of the total value
of the funds and that the on-going costs of the divestiture program
would amount to 1/20 of 1 % of the total value of the funds. 6
In addition to the inquiry concerning the costs of divestiture, the
trial judge considered the financial risk to the beneficiaries from divest-
iture. The trial judge found that the Ordinance did not hinder the
Trustees from investing in a diversified portfolio, although it may have
affected their pursuit of an "active" management style. Rather, the
Trustees could manage a South Africa free portfolio without failing to
fulfill their duty of loyalty and prudence to the funds' beneficiaries.' 7
Due to the minimal impact of the divestiture program on the bene-
ficiaries and the "salutary moral principle" underlying the Ordinance,
the trial judge rejected all of the arguments by the Trustees and appli-
cants for intervention.' 8 They subsequently appealed to the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals. At the request of the Trustees, the applicants
for intervention, and the City, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
certiorari to review the case.' 9
II. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
In its lengthy seventy-six page opinion, the Court of Appeals care-
fully considered the merits of the issues presented by the petitioners. To
simplify the Court's analysis, the issues can be divided into three major
13. Id. at 84, 562 A.2d at 726.
14. Id. at 85-86, 562 A.2d at 726.
15. Initial costs would include, for example, the cost of replacing certain holdings
with South Africa-free investments. Ongoing costs would be associated with replacing
investments in the STIF and additional commissions. Id. at 86, 562 A.2d at 726-727.
16. The Court calculated the initial and ongoing costs of divestiture to be
$750,000 and $1.2 million, repectively, out of a total fund value of $1.2 billion. Id. at
87, 562 A.2d at 727.
17. Id. at 85, 562 A.2d at 726.
18. Id. at 87-88, 562 A.2d at 727.
19. Id. at 88, 562 A.2d at 727.
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categories: (1) procedure; (2) the specifics of the divestiture ordinance
as it relates to pension funds; and (3) the impact of local laws on the
conduct of foreign policy. This note will primarily focus on the latter
two categories.20
A. The Impact of the Ordinance on Public Pension Funds
1. Permissible Delegation of Legislative Power
The Trustees initially attacked the Ordinance on the ground that
it impermissibly delegated a governmental function to a private entity,
the Africa Fund. According to the Trustees, by linking the divestment
to the companies identified by the list supplied by the Africa Fund, the
Ordinance would render the Trustees unable to make decisions about
investments for the beneficiaries of the pension systems.21 The Court
responded by noting that the list from the Africa Fund was only a ref-
erence for the Trustees, and, as such, it constituted a reasonable stan-
dard for guidelines about United States companies doing business in
South Africa. The Court clearly held that the Trustees, not the Africa
Fund, had the final word on investment decisions.22 in addition, the
Court suggested that the term "doing business" in or with South Africa
should be construed in the same way as it had been used in other Ma-
ryland cases.23 Thus, the Court of Appeals effectively connected the
20. In essence, the key procedural issue in this case concerned the motion by the
four pension fund beneficiaries to intervene on the side of the Trustees. The Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial judge's application of Maryland Rule 2-214 (a)(2)
which states in pertinent part:
Upon timely motion, a person shall be permitted to intervene in an
action...
(2) when the person claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action that is the subject of the action, and the person.is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede
the ability to protect that interest, unless it is adequately represented by
existing parties.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the Trustees have obligations to the
City, as well as to the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries' interests are not identical to those
of the Trustees. See Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 91, 562 A.2d at 729.
The Court of Appeals modified the Circuit Court's decision and permitted the
applicants for intervention to have the status of a party in the case. Id. at 91-92, 562
A.2d at 729. It should be mentioned that this is the only point-which challengers to the
divestment ordinances won in this case.
21. Id. at 92, 562 A.2d at 730.
22. Id. at 98, 562 A.2d at 732.
23. Id. at 98-99, 562 A.2d at 733. The Court noted that it has previously con-
strued "doing business" in a geographical area to mean "doing a substantial amount of
1990]
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issue of divestment based on moral principles to more ordinary issues,
such as contract disputes, that were typically resolved by the courts.
2. No Impairment of Contractual Obligations with Beneficiaries
The Trustees next argued that because the Ordinance interfered
with the relationship between the City and pension beneficiaries, 24 it
violated Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution, familiarly
known as the Contracts Clause, which states, "[n]o State. . .shall pass
any. . . .Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ." The Court
broke down this claim into three distinct sub-issues.2 5 First, the Court
held that the City unquestionably imposed contractual obligations be-
tween itself and the pension beneficiaries by establishing a pension sys-
tem. Second, the Court rejected the Trustees' contention that the Ordi-
nance constituted an indirect change in the way the pension funds
could be invested. Third, the Court, relying strongly on the trial court's
finding of fact which was held to be not clearly erroneous, firmly stated
that the insubstantial way in which the Ordinance modified Trustees'
investment decisions did not approach the constitutional standard for
an impairment of contract.26
3. No Change in Trustees' Duty of Prudence and Loyalty to
Beneficiaries
The Trustees asserted that the Ordinance would significantly alter
their duty of loyalty and prudence to the beneficiaries in the following
ways: (1) The Ordinance would disturb the beneficiaries' expectations
that their benefits will be well secured;2 7 (2) the Ordinance would im-
prudently and radically alter the universe of eligible investments for the
pension systems; 28 (3) the Ordinance would mandate that the Trustees
consider social factors unrelated to investment performance;29 and (4)
the Ordinance would require the Trustees to consider the interests of
business" or "engaging in significant business activity." See, e.g., Yangming Transport
v. Revon Products, 311 Md. 496, 504-509; 536 A.2d 633, 637-640 (1988); S.A.S. Per-
sonnel Consultants v. Pat-Pan, 286 Md. 335, 339-340, 407 A.2d 1139, 1142 (1979);
and GEM Inc. v. Plough Inc., 228 Md. 484, 488-489. 180 A.2d 478, 481 (1962).
24. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 99, 562 A.2d at 733.
25. In addressing this issue, the Court applied the framework for analysis that it
used previously in Robert T. Foley Co. v. W.S.S.C., 283 Md. 140, 151-152, 389 A.2d
350, 357 (1978).
26. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 100-101, 562 A.2d at 733-734.
27. Id. at 102, 562 A.2d at 734.
28. Id. at 103, 562 A.2d at 735.
29. Id. at 105, 562 A.2d at 736.
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persons other than the beneficiaries and to manage the systems for pur-
poses other than providing benefits.30 The Court easily set aside these
arguments by noting that economically competitive investments were
available to the Trustees and that the Ordinance permitted a gradual
two-year transition period; coupled with a suspension of divestiture
under certain conditions, before the divestiture program was com-
pleted."1 In addition, the Court held that consideration of social factors
is perfectly proper in making an investment decision and emphasized
that trustees are not forced to achieve a maximum return on their in-
vestments, only a reasonable return while avoiding undue risks.3 2
4. No Taking by the Government
Intervenors in the case next argued the initial and ongoing costs of
divestiture would reduce the future earnings of the pension funds and
consequently reduce the amount of variable benefits payable to the ben-
eficiaries. They reasoned that such a reduction in the variable benefits
was a violation of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution and amounted to a taking of property from
citizens by the government. 3 The Court did not even find a due process
argument34 and completely rejected any argument for compensation for
a taking for three reasons: (1) The Intervenors' right to receive benefits
does not mean that they have the right to direct or control the invest-
ment of funds in the City's pension systems; (2) there can be no dis-
tinct investment expectations from variable benefits which are, by defi-
nition, speculative and uncertain; and (3) there is no taking because the
Ordinance promotes the common good and does not shift funds from
the beneficiaries to the government or anyone else. 5
30. Id. at 109, 562 A.2d at 738.
31. Id. at 105, 562 A.2d at 736-737.
32. Id. at 106-107, 562 A.2d at 736-737. The Court relied on the commentary of
Professor Austin W. Scott in his authoritative treatise, III A. W. SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS, Section 227.17 (4th ed. 1988). See Also, Troyer, Slocomb, and Boisture, Di-
vestment of South African Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations,
Other Charitable Institutions and Pension Funds, 74 GEO. L.J. 127, 156-157 (1985).
The authors of the above article note that the legal guidelines for directors who would
make decisions concerning the divestment of corporate stock from holdings in South
Africa are more flexible than those for trustees. Corporate directors need only appply
the "business judgment rule" to comply with the required duty of loyalty and care to
the stockholders. Id. at 134-136.
33. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 110, 562 A.2d at 738.
34. Id. at lll n. 38, 562 A.2d at 739.
35. Id. at 113-114, 562 A.2d at 739-740.
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B. Impact of the Ordinance on Foreign Policy
Much of the recent legal literature on U.S. anti-apartheid efforts
through the divestment of funds focuses on state or municipal divest-
ment statutes in terms of their constitutionality and their impact on the
conduct of foreign policy.36 As in the earlier part of the Maryland opin-
ion, the Court of Appeals refused to accept any of the Trustees' or
Intervenors' arguments on the impact of the Ordinance on U.S. foreign
policy.
1. No Federal Preemption of Ordinance
The Trustees argued that the Ordinance violates the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and therefore is pre-empted37 by the Com-
prehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA).38 The Court rea-
soned that a federal law can preempt a state or local ordinance in three
fundamental ways: (1) by expressly stating its intention to do so; (2) by
"occupying the field," i.e., by including a federal regulatory scheme
that is so comprehensive that there is in effect nothing more that the
states can do; and (3) by conflicting directly with the state law. At the
outset, the Court observed that preemption is not lightly presumed, es-
pecially in areas that are traditionally regulated by states such as the
pension systems at issue in this case.3 9
The Court of Appeals proceeded to analyze the preemption argu-
ment by examining the legislative history of the CAAA. Preemption
was first addressed in 1985 when Senators Roth and McConnell circu-
lated an amendment expressly calling for preemption under in- the
CAAA. This amendment was subsequently withdrawn, according to
36. See, e.g., Bowden, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67
N.C.L. REV. 949, (1989); Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of
State and Local Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L.REv. 469 (1987); Note: State and
Municpal Governments' React Against South African Apartheid: An Assessment of
the Constitutionality of the Divestment Campaign, 54 U. CIN. L.REv. 543 (1985);
Note: State and Local Anti-South African Action as an Intrusion upon the Federal
Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986). For an excellent general over-
view of the constitutional implication of the states' involvement in foreign affairs, see L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, Chapter IX (1972).
37. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore 317 Md. at 114, 562 A.2d at 740.
38. Among other things, the CAAA prohibits loans to, other investments in, and
certain other activities in South Africa, prohibits U.S. imports from companies owned
or controlled by the South African Government, and prohibits new investments in
South Africa. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1089 (1986); 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151 n(f), (g),
2150, 2346(d), 5001-50016 (West Supp. 1989).
39. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore 317 Md. at 115, 562 A.2d. at 740-741.
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Senator Kennedy, "in the face of certain defeat."40 In addition, at the
time of the amendment's withdrawal, Senators Pell, Cranston, Hart,
and Proxmire strongly objected to preemption. 1
The Court viewed the legislative history of section 5116 of the
CAAA as having a possible "preemptive effect" limited to state or lo-
cal procurement legislation which might cause a federally-funded con-
tract not to be awarded to the lowest bidder.' 2 However, the Court of
Appeals discounted this possible preemptive effect in light of the force-
ful remarks of Senator Kennedy, the CAAA's co-author, who vigor-
ously asserted that the CAAA was to have no preemptive effect.' 3 Fur-
ther, the proceedings in the House of Representatives strongly
indicated no Congressional intent to preempt." Thus, the Court con-
cluded that there was no express Congressional intent to preempt state
or local legislation or to "occupy the field."
The Trustees also tried to show that the Ordinance 'represented
inflexible sanctions toward South Africa and therefore conflicted with
the approach of the CAAA.' 5 However, the Court interpreted the Ordi-
nance as merely relating to the conduct of businesses in which the City
invests, and not as sanctions against the government of South Africa."'
This interpretation may serve to broaden the scope of the market par-
ticipant exception to include foreign nations, as well as the more famil-
iar application to "foreign" states within the United States.
40. 132 CONG. REC. S12533 (daily ed., Sept. 15, 1986)
41. See 131 CONG. REC. S18835 and S 18330, S18224, S18787, S18784 (daily
ed. July 11, 1985)
42. 317 Md. at 118, 562 A.2d at 742. Section 5116 of the CAAA states the
following:
Notwithstanding section 210 of Public Law 99-349 or any other provision
of the law -
(1) No reduction in the amount of funds for which a state or local gov-
ernment is eligible or entitled under any Federal law may be made, and
(2) No other penalty may be imposed by the Federal Government by
reason of application of any state or local law concerning apartheid to any
contract entered into by a state or local government for 90 days after October
2, 1986.
43. 132 CONG. REC. S12533 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1986)
44. See remarks of Representatives Gray, Leland, Solarz, Weiss, Levine, Rangel,
Biaggi, Dixon, and Wheat. 132 CONG. REC. H.R. 6758-6767 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1986)
45. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. 72, 562 A.2d 720.
46. Id. at 120, 562 A.2d at 743.
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2. No Interference with Federal Authority to Conduct Foreign
Policy
The Trustees next argued that the Ordinance impermissibly inter-
fered with the federal government's general authority to execute for-
eign policy of the United States.47 The Court rejected this argument by
distinguishing the holding of an important case, Zchernig v. Miller;,
8
from this case. In Zchernig, the Supreme Court barred the application
of a state alien inheritance law which required inquiry into the type of
government existing in particular foreign countries because it would in-
trude into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to
the President and Congress. 9 As interpreted by Professor Laurence
Tribe, the Zchernig court held that "all state action, whether or not
consistent with federal foreign policy, that has significant impact on the
conduct of American diplomacy is void as an unconstitutional infringe-
ment upon an exclusively federal sphere of responsibility." 50
Once again, the Court relied heavily on the trial judge's finding of
fact to overcome the hurdles presented by Zchernig. Because the Ordi-
nance represented a single general decision of the City to manage its
own investments, as opposed to addressing the intricacies of South Af-
rica's apartheid laws, the Court reasoned that the Ordinances did not
cross the boundary into federal areas of responsibility.51 In addition,
the Court stressed that the purpose of the Ordinance was to express the
City's moral indignation towards apartheid, but that in fact, the Ordi-
nance had only a minimal and indirect impact on South Africa. 52 The
Court reiterated the internal focus of the Ordinance, especially when it
compared the ordinance with other cases where state or local jurisdic-
tions have unsuccessfully tried to enact anti-apartheid legislation or ad-
ministrative rulings. 53 Whether or not the Baltimore Ordinance and
47. Id. at 121, 562 A.2d at 744.
48. 389 U.S. 429, (1968).
49. Id. at 432.
50. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 230 (1988).
51. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore, 317 Md. at 126, 562 A. 2d. at 746.
52. Id. at 131, 562 A.2d at 748-749.
53. The Court distinguished its holding here with the decisions of other courts
that have faced apartheid issues. See, e.g., New York Times v. City Commission on
Human Rights, 41 N.Y. 2d 345, 393 N.Y.S. 2d 312, 361 N.E. 2d 963 (1977) (where
newspaper advertisements for employment opportunities located in South Africa which
merely referred to that country as the situs of employment, and which did not recite on
the surface any discriminatory conditions, did not violate New York City's anti-dis-
crimination laws.); Springfield Rare Coins Galleries, Inc. v. Johnson, 115 I11. 2d 221,
503 N.E. 2d 300 (1986) (where disapproval of political and social policies of a foreign
nation does not provide a valid basis for a tax classification, and the state may not
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other sanctions embodied in federal legislation have had, in fact, only a
minimal and indirect impact on South Africa will undoubtedly be re-
examined in light of recent changes in the South African political
landscape.
3. No Violation of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the Constitution affirmatively empowers
the Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States. . . ."5 In addition to this affirmative grant of
power, a judicially created doctrine, the "negative" or "dormant" Com-
merce Clause has developed since the early days of our nation.55 The
dormant Commerce Clause limits by implication the power of state and
local governments to enact legislation which affects foreign or inter-
state commerce.
The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners' arguments that the
Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause by applying a rela-
tively new exception to the Commerce Clause, the market participation
doctrine. Enunciated initially in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corpora-
tion,56 this doctrine permits state and local governments to escape the
constraints of the dormant Commerce Clause when acting as a buyer
or a seller in the market, as opposed to a regulator in a distinct govern-
mental capacity. Just as a private merchant may elect not to do busi-
ness in South Africa, so too may the City choose not to do business
with a South African company under the reasoning of the market par-
ticipation doctrine. As the Hughes Court reiterated, the purpose of the
Ordinance was not to punish anyone, but to remove a "perceived moral
taint" from the City's investments. 57
The Court of Appeals had no guidance from the Supreme Court
as to whether the market participation doctrine applied to the conduct
exercise its wide-ranging taxing power for the purpose of encouraging the boycott of a
single nation's products.); Regents of the University of Michigan v. State of Michigan,
166 Mich. App. 314, 419 N.W.2d 773 (1988)(where State statute that prohibits state
educational institutions from making or maintaining an investment "in organizations
operating in South Africa" is unconstitutional as applied because the state constitution
grants the Regents plenary authority to allocate university funds); and Associated Stu-
dents of the University of Oregon v. Oregon Investment Council, 82 Or. App. 145, 728
P.2d 30 (1986)(where complaint dismissed for lack of standing by plaintiff).
54. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
55. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, (1824) and Cooley v. Bd.
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, (1851).
56. 426 U.S. 794, (1976).
57. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore 317 Md. at 136, 562 A.2d at 751. See Also, 69
Op. Att'y. Gen. of Md. 87 (1984).
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of state and local governments that affects foreign commerce. However,
the Supreme Court has indicated that a more extensive constitutional
inquiry is needed if the issue to be resolved involves foreign commerce,
as contrasted with interstate commerce issues.58 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals reasoned that the purposes behind the dormant Com-
merce Clause and the foreign Commerce Clause were essentially the
same, i.e., to prevent individual states from adversely affecting relations
with foreign countries that were properly coordinated at the federal
level.59
The Court further noted that the power of the federal government
over foreign commerce is not totally exclusive. While the Court ac-
knowledged that the United States should speak with one voice in mat-
ters of foreign policy, it declared that this voice need not solely belong
to the federal government. Because the Ordinances were broadly con-
sistent with federal policy as articulated in the CAAA and because
they did not undermine the federal government's ability to develop uni-
form trade regulations toward South Africa, it is constitutional.60
The Court further eroded the Trustees' dormant Commerce
Clause argument by stating that the Ordinance would survive constitu-
tional scrutiny even without the market participation exception."' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the three-pronged test es-
tablished in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.6 2 which requires that the stat-
ute at issue effectuate a legitimate public purpose, affect interstate
commerce only incidentally, and not burden such commerce exces-
sively. In applying the Bruce Church test, the Court found that the
Ordinance applies equally to the residents of Baltimore and to residents
of all other states; that the purpose of the Ordinance is indisputably
legitimate; and that the burden of the Ordinance is minimal in relation
to its benefits.6 3
III. OTHER STATE STATUTES AIMED AT DIVESTMENT FROM SOUTH
AFRICA
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals wrote the first opinion in
the nation to rule on the constitutionality of divestment legislation,
neither Maryland nor Baltimore City were the first jurisdictions to en-
58. See, e.g. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, (1979).
59. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore 317 Md.at 138, 562 A.2d at 752.
60. Id. at 146-147, 562 A.2d at 756-757.
61. Id. at 141, 562 A.2d at 753.
62. 397 U.S. 137 (1974).
63. Board of Trustees v. Baltimore 317 Md. at 142-143, 562 A.2d 754-755.
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act divestment statutes. Connecticut was the first state to enact divest-
ment legislation in 19821", and many other state and local governments
followed Connecticut's lead. According to the American Committee on
Africa, as of November 1989, twenty-five states, nineteen counties,
eighty-two cities, and the Virgin Islands have taken some form of eco-
nomic action against apartheid.6 5
State statutes approach divestment of public funds from holdings
in South Africa in two alternative ways. The approach taken by Mas-
sachusetts typifies the first alternative, full or absolute divestment. Sim-
ply stated, no public pension funds from Massachusetts can be invested
in South African banks or in companies doing business with South
Africa."6
Other states do not use such a bright line test in their divestment
statues. In addition to determining whether a financial institution or
company is doing business with South Africa, these statutes forbid
states from investing in entities that do not comply with specific stan-
dards of conduct. For example, North Carolina applies this additional
condition to its divestment statute by prohibiting investments in compa-
nies or financial institutions which are not signatories to the Sullivan
Principles67 or which have received a failing performance rating for
compliance with the Sullivan Principles.
The Baltimore Ordinance represents a compromise between the
two general approaches used by states in divestment statutes. The Bal-
64. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., §§ 3-13(f)(1985).
65. See AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFRICA, SUMMARY CHART: STATES, COUNTIES
AND CITIES THAT HAVE TAKEN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID (1989).
The American Committee on Africa classifies economic actions against South Af-
rican apartheid into three distinct categories:
(1) Divestment - the sale of stock and/or bonds from companies that do business in
South Africa;
(2) Banking - the withdrawal of funds and/or business from banks on the basis of their
ties to South Africa; and
(3) Purchasing - the policy that gives preference in the bidding process for the purchas-
ing of goods and services to those companies that do not do business in South Africa.
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN., ch. 32, § 23(1)(d)(ii).
67. As noted in Bowden, North Carolina's South African Divestment Statute, 67
N.C.L. REV., n.3, at 949 (1989), the Sullivan Principles were developed in 1978 by the
Reverend Leon H. Sullivan, a Philadelphia minister and Director of the General Mo-
tors Corporation. In essence, the Sullivan Principles provide for equality in compensa-
tion, employment, and access for South Africans of all races. It is interesting to note
that as of 1984, the Reverend Sullivan has repudiated his principles and has suggested
severing business ties between the United States and South Africa. The Sullivan Prin-
ciples are incorporated directly into North Carolina's divestment statute. See N.C.
GEN. STAT., §§ 147-69.2(c)(2).
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timore Ordinance does not mandate absolute and total divestment by a
specific date like the Massachusetts statute, nor does it impose an elab-
orate code of conduct on entities involved with South Africa like the
North Carolina statute. Instead, the Baltimore Ordinance, as inter-
preted by the Maryland Court of Appeals, permits the expression of
two legitimate and occasionally competing interests: the financial inter-
ests of pension beneficiaries who in retirement depend on the income
generated by their pension funds and the political and moral interests
of citizens who wish to direct public monies away from investments
they consider to be unacceptable. 8
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In evaluating the significance of this case, the court's interpreta-
tion goes beyond the immediate concerns of the citizens of Baltimore
and general animosity towards apartheid. The structure of the Ordi-
nance and the reasoning of this opinion make it possible for citizens to
direct investments in public pension funds away from other entities that
are undesireable.
With respect to the impact of state or local laws on foreign policy,
it seems improbable that these types of statutes would survive judicial
scrutiny unless they were clearly harmonious with federal policy. Un-
questionably, the Court found the Ordinance to be consistent with the
federal CAAA. Absent a strong federal statute, there are too many
hurdles that the state and local governments must overcome in order to
assert themselves in the foreign policy arena.
In addition, the Maryland Court of Appeals repeatedly found that
the purpose of the Ordinance was to express the moral outrage of the
citizens of Baltimore at the legacy of slavery that South African
apartheid represents. As such, this opinion may significantly broaden
the impact of the market participant doctrine by allowing states greater
discretion to direct their financial and business choices without violat-
ing the Commerce Clause. Absent a clear federal policy, however, this
type of legislation cannot be used to force divestment from public pen-
sion funds of investments in companies doing business with or in for-
eign regimes whose policies may be repugant to Americans.
At this time, much of the world's attention is focused on the issue
of apartheid. The election of President De Klerk and the recent release
of Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress, after
a twenty-seven year prison term have prompted intense media coverage
68. See supra at note 9 and accompanying text.
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of South Africa. 9 In the intricate negotiations that will inevitably fol-
low, it is obvious that some new type of political arrangement among
South Africans of all races will emerge.
The extent to which the United States can influence this process
through the continuation of sanctions established by the CAAA, tradi-
tional diplomatic measures, and legislation such as the Baltimore Ordi-
nance, remains to be seen. However, it is unlikely that the United
States government will move immediately to revise the sanctions con-
tained in the CAAA.7 ° Not only have influential legislators in Congress
expressed their support for keeping economic sanctions against South
Africa in place7", but Bush Administration spokesman, Herman Cohen,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, characterized the
1986 sanctions as "wise" and helpful in encouraging "many whites [in
South Africa] to come to their senses." Ambassador Cohen added that
the Bush Administration is committed to "full implementation of all
provisions" of the sanctions law.72
In sum, the Baltimore Ordinance upheld by the Maryland Court
of Appeals represents one of many elements in the mix that makes up
United States foreign policy on South Africa. Without question, the
Ordinance represents an idealistic strand of our policy which is not
based solely on classical "real politick," but extends the moral judg-
ment of citizens that is occasionally expressed through local and state
governments.
Cynthia Golomb
69. See e.g., Whitaker et al., Mandela is Free: Breakthrough in South Africa,
Newsweek, Feb. 19, 1990, at 36; Escape from Apartheid, Washington Post, Feb. 18,
1990, at B6, col.1; and Eddings, The Challenges Ahead for Mandela, de Klerk, Balti-
more Sun, Feb. 18, 1990, at 7G, col.1.
70. In contrast, the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom has already
lifted its bans on new investments in South Africa and on the promotion of tourism to
South Africa. See Los Angeles Times, Feb. 23, 1990, Part P, at 2, col.3.
71. S. Con. Res. 94, 136 CONG. REC. S1525, S1526 (daily ed., Feb. 22, 1990).
72. Quoted in Friedman, U.S. Law Makers: Don't Lift Sanctions, Newsday, Feb.
23, 1990, at 15.
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